Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
zbMATH Open document ID: 0479.90013
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(82)90043-9
author: Prasanta K. Pattanaik
author: Manimay Sengupta
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1982-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3754365
zbMATH Keywords: absence of non-trivial decision rules
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: pairwise comparison
zbMATH Keywords: honest voting
zbMATH Keywords: undominated voting strategies
zbMATH Keywords: sophisticated voting
zbMATH Keywords: core
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(82)90043-9
OpenAlex ID: W2053716542
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3754365