Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
zbMATH Open document ID: 0481.90001
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
author: Roger B. Myerson
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 1982-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C05
zbMATH DE Number: 3756181
zbMATH Keywords: general principal-agent problem
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: private decisions
zbMATH Keywords: incentive-compatible direct coordination mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: correlated equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: non-cooperative equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: quasi-equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: game design
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0304-4068(82)90006-4
OpenAlex ID: W1969795839
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3756181