Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 0747.90008
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90050-U
author: Lin Zhou
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1992-06-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90-08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 05C70
zbMATH DE Number: 23364
zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance algorithm
zbMATH Keywords: marriage problem
zbMATH Keywords: stable matching
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
cites work: Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(91)90050-u
OpenAlex ID: W2078929198
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 23364