Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs
zbMATH Open document ID: 0748.90088
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90216-8
author: Somdeb Lahiri
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1992-06-28T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper considers a two-person bargaining problem where each player \(i\) chooses and reveals a disagreement point \(d_ i\) from the interval [0,1], the arbitrator chooses a Pareto optimal outcome and each player \(i\) has a belief function \(G_ i\) of acceptance of the final outcome. The author restricts his attention to a bargaining region forming a compact convex subset of the unit square containing (0,0), (1,0) and (0,1). The main result of the paper is: Under a certain specification of belief functions \(G_ i\), (0,0) is a Nash equilibrium in the disagreement revelation game if and only if the arbitrator's bargaining scheme is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
reviewed by: Mamoru Kaneko
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 34955
zbMATH Keywords: two-person bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: disagreement revelation game
zbMATH Keywords: Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(91)90216-8
OpenAlex ID: W2012449773
cites work: A one-shot bargaining problem
cites work: Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
cites work: Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
cites work: Q3335556
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 34955