Unique solutions for strategic games. Equilibrium selection based on resistance avoidance
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Unique solutions for strategic games. Equilibrium selection based on resistance avoidance
zbMATH Open document ID: 0693.90099
author: Brigitte Kalkofen
author: Werner Güth
published in: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
publication date: 1992-09-17T00:00:00Z
review text: The monograph deals, within the theory of strategic games, with the concept of player's resistance against a proposed solution, given a status quo solution. This concept is a basis for refining the equilibrium concept and then, by procedures similar to those of \textit{J. C. Harsanyi} and \textit{R. Selten} [``A general theory of equilibrium selection in games'' (1988; Zbl 0693.90098)] involving cell and irreducible games, they define a selection of just one equilibrium for a game. This procedure is called ESBORA (equilibrium selection based on resistance avoidance). The authors also discuss the applications to economic decision problems and social conflict situations as well as possible extensions and modifications of the theory.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90-02
zbMATH DE Number: 43773
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: strategic games
zbMATH Keywords: irreducible games
zbMATH Keywords: ESBORA
zbMATH Keywords: resistance avoidance
reviewed by: Andrzej Wieczorek
MaRDI profile type: Publication
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43773