Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0764.90102
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90018-N
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1992-09-27T00:00:00Z
review text: In social choice problems where players may strategically misrepresent their preferences, a profile of preferences is called self-optimal if reporting them is a Nash equilibrium given that they are the true preferences. Self-optimality can be interpreted as a very weak honesty requirement. The self-optimality concept is applied to a utility distortion game in the context of bargaining; this yields a characterization of efficient Nash equilibria.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B16
zbMATH DE Number: 57739
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: self-optimality
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: utility distortion game
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
author: Hans Peters
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q5668220
cites work: Q3332693
cites work: Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
cites work: Q3677437
cites work: Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
cites work: The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
full work available at URL: 0899-8256(92)90018-n
OpenAlex ID: W2048189671
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 57739