Information leakage forces cooperation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information leakage forces cooperation
zbMATH Open document ID: 0755.90101
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90007-9
author: Akihiko Matsui
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1992-09-27T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 786.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 62845
zbMATH Keywords: two-person repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: probability of espionage
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1980260655
cites work: Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
cites work: Q4546352
cites work: Q3956774
cites work: Cooperation and bounded recall
cites work: Finitely Repeated Games
cites work: A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
cites work: Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
cites work: The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments
cites work: Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
cites work: Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
cites work: The chain store paradox
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 62845