An ''evolutionary'' interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An ''evolutionary'' interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
zbMATH Open document ID: 0825.90836
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90004-X
author: Vincent P. Crawford
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1992-09-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 61237
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: 0899-8256(91)90004-x
OpenAlex ID: W2077457687
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 61237