Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown
zbMATH Open document ID: 0825.90817
DOI: 10.1007/BF00134151
author: Rami Zwick
author: Amnon Rapoport
author: John C. Howard
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 1992-09-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 65158
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
cites work: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
cites work: Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
cites work: On the robustness of perfect equilibrium in fixed cost sequential bargaining under an isomorphic transformation
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 65158