Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
zbMATH Open document ID: 0753.90016
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90011-I
author: Edward J. Green
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1992-09-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 65217
zbMATH Keywords: likelihood-ratio contracts
zbMATH Keywords: principal-agent situations
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3962740
cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
cites work: Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
cites work: Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
cites work: Q3262608
cites work: Q5732164
full work available at URL: 0899-8256(90)90011-i
OpenAlex ID: W2085511009
Recommended article: Some Results on Classical Preferential Models
Recommended article: Q3262617
Recommended article: Statistical inference as a bargaining game
Recommended article: Q3218909
Recommended article: On incentive-compatible estimators
Recommended article: Expected utility theory under non-classical uncertainty
Recommended article: On a statistical approach to choice under uncertainty
Recommended article: Statistical mechanics of choice: MaxEnt estimation of population heterogeneity
Recommended article: Statistical theory of the continuous double auction
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 65217