Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
zbMATH Open document ID: 0753.90085
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90015-M
author: Eythan Weg
author: Amnon Rapoport
author: Dan S. Felsenthal
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1992-09-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 65221
zbMATH Keywords: noncooperative game
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
cites work: A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Perfect sequential equilibrium
cites work: Persistent equilibria in strategic games
cites work: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
cites work: Sequential Equilibria
cites work: Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
cites work: Non-cooperative games
cites work: Two-Person Cooperative Games
cites work: On stability of perfect equilibrium points
cites work: Q3813639
cites work: Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining
cites work: The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
cites work: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
cites work: Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
cites work: Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
full work available at URL: 0899-8256(90)90015-m
OpenAlex ID: W2069681584
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 65221