Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0764.90104
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90048-W
author: Lones Smith
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1992-09-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 64065
zbMATH Keywords: perfect folk theorems for repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: overlapping generations
zbMATH Keywords: finite-lived players
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: 0899-8256(92)90048-w
OpenAlex ID: W2016792078
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 64065