On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0764.90096
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90049-X
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1992-09-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 64066
zbMATH Keywords: self-enforcement
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfection
author: Jörgen W. Weibull
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: 0899-8256(92)90049-x
OpenAlex ID: W2024390822
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 64066