On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
zbMATH Open document ID: 0773.90003
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90051-S
author: Takehiko Yamato
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1992-09-27T00:00:00Z
review text: The purpose of this paper is to characterize the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences in fairly general settings. More specifically, the author successfully extends Danilov's conditions for Nash implementation in that the set of alternatives is now arbitrary and the domain of preferences consists of all weak orders. It remains to be seen, however, how this type of abstract model can be applied to real economic environments.
reviewed by: Yasuhiro Sakai
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 64068
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: Nash implementation
zbMATH Keywords: weak orders
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
cites work: Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
cites work: Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
cites work: A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
cites work: Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 64068