Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0753.90018
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(90)90002-C
author: James W. Friedman
author: Larry Samuelson
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1993-01-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
zbMATH DE Number: 89279
zbMATH Keywords: existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: discounting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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cites work: Non-trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions
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full work available at URL: 0899-8256(90)90002-c
OpenAlex ID: W2067253723
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 89279