Renegotiation in repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Renegotiation in repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0754.90082
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3
author: Joseph Farrell
author: Eric Maskin
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1993-01-16T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 9wv3h5jb
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B60
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 89296
zbMATH Keywords: subgame-perfect equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: renegotiation
zbMATH Keywords: prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: duopolies
zbMATH Keywords: advertising game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2132980074
cites work: Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
cites work: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
cites work: Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
cites work: Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
cites work: Efficient renegotiation - proof equilibria in repeated games
cites work: Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
cites work: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
cites work: On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
cites work: A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
cites work: Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 89296