Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
zbMATH Open document ID: 0756.90011
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(05)80048-1
author: Stefan Krasa
author: Anne P. Villamil
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1993-01-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B28
zbMATH DE Number: 89323
zbMATH Keywords: financial intermediation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Financial intermediary-coalitions
cites work: The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
cites work: Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
cites work: Q3933198
cites work: Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
cites work: Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Reply
cites work: Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
cites work: Q4443503
full work available at URL: s0022-0531(05)80048-1
OpenAlex ID: W2095580670
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 89323