Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result''
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Democracy and efficiency: A note on ``Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result''
zbMATH Open document ID: 0762.90003
DOI: 10.1016/0377-2217(92)90073-I
author: Denis Bouyssou
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 1993-01-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 91819
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's impossibility result
zbMATH Keywords: aggregation procedure
zbMATH Keywords: oligarchies
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Social choice and individual values
cites work: On realizable biorders and the biorder dimension of a relation
cites work: Partially Ordered Sets
cites work: Q3741337
cites work: Arrow's theorem is not a surprising result
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 91819