Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Open document ID: 0758.90092
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90036-H
author: George J. Mailath
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1993-01-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-01
zbMATH DE Number: 97363
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: 0022-0531(92)90036-h
OpenAlex ID: W2080158665
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 97363