Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
zbMATH Open document ID: 0760.90098
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90038-J
author: Jeroen M. Swinkels
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1993-01-17T00:00:00Z
review text: The strategy that upsets a potential evolutionarily stable strategy may in itself be very unstable, or may differ from the candidate strategy only in irrelevant ways. This paper develops a solution concept addressing these difficulties. We look for a set of Nash equilibria such that small groups of entrants whose members are satisfied with their entry cannot take the population out of the set. Such a set is robust to the iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies, depends only on the reduced normal form, and has the never a weak best response property. For generic two person extensive form games, such sets generate payoffs consistent with proper equilibria.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 97365
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionarily stable strategy
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 97365