Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
zbMATH Open document ID: 0768.90099
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90039-K
author: Jeroen M. Swinkels
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1993-01-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 97366
zbMATH Keywords: evolution
zbMATH Keywords: strategically stable subset
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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cites work: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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cites work: Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
cites work: Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
cites work: Q3474501
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 97366