Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 0759.90010
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(92)90266-2
author: Pierre de Trenqualye
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1993-01-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 98570
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficient mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: individually rational allocations
zbMATH Keywords: public good economies
zbMATH Keywords: non-monotonic preferences
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: two-agent economy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(92)90266-2
OpenAlex ID: W2069781116
cites work: A Tatonement Process for Public Goods
cites work: Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
cites work: Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
cites work: A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy
cites work: Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
cites work: A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 98570