Stability of voting games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stability of voting games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0781.90102
DOI: 10.1007/BF00187432
author: Shuhe Li
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1993-05-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 166012
zbMATH Keywords: far-sighted core
zbMATH Keywords: stable set
zbMATH Keywords: proper symmetric simple game
zbMATH Keywords: winning coalition
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00187432
OpenAlex ID: W2061193005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 166012