Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0315.90088
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2
author: Mark Allen Satterthwaite
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1975-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 122.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A35
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D99
zbMATH DE Number: 3494199
Wikidata QID: Q55868063
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2129678216
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3494199