Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies
zbMATH Open document ID: 0362.90007
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(77)90129-6
author: Elisha A. Pazner
author: Eugene Wesley
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1977-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 154.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D99
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A35
zbMATH DE Number: 3564629
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2015813727
cites work: Social choice and individual values
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cites work: Model theory
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3564629