Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 0365.90143
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(77)90069-2
author: Bhaskar Dutta
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1977-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A35
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 3570239
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(77)90069-2
OpenAlex ID: W1985216468
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3570239