Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0374.90001
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(77)90067-9
author: Peter Fishburn
author: William V. Gehrlein
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1977-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B16
zbMATH DE Number: 3583540
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(77)90067-9
OpenAlex ID: W2082419013
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3583540