Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
zbMATH Open document ID: 0393.90005
DOI: 10.1007/BF00126341
author: Donald E. Campbell
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 1979-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3611019
zbMATH Keywords: Social Choice Rules
zbMATH Keywords: Strategic Nomination
zbMATH Keywords: Voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3611019