A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
zbMATH Open document ID: 0402.90011
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7
author: K. Appert
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1979-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 3625060
zbMATH Keywords: Strong Equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Core
zbMATH Keywords: Economies with Public Goods
zbMATH Keywords: Noncooperative Games of Excahange
zbMATH Keywords: General Equilibrium Theory
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(79)90060-7
OpenAlex ID: W2170219120
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3625060