Bargaining with common values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining with common values
zbMATH Open document ID: 0686.90045
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90119-1
author: Daniel R. Vincent
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 775.pdf
review text: This paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated. It shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement. The paper characterizes the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed sellers. It also shows, by example, that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 4125210
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: delay to agreement
zbMATH Keywords: unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2072935944
cites work: Strategic Delay in Bargaining
cites work: Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
cites work: Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
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cites work: A Multistage Model of Bargaining
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4125210