Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
zbMATH Open document ID: 0913.90103
DOI: 10.1016/0377-2217(95)00265-0
author: Richard M. Bradford
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 1999-05-31T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1208600
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: revelation principle
zbMATH Keywords: pricing
zbMATH Keywords: assignment of customers to servers
zbMATH Keywords: congestion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0377-2217(95)00265-0
OpenAlex ID: W2050042869
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1208600