Inspection games in arms control
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Inspection games in arms control
zbMATH Open document ID: 0909.90289
DOI: 10.1016/0377-2217(95)00261-8
author: Bernhard von Stengel
author: Shmuel Zamir
author: Rudolf Avenhaus
author: Morton John Canty
author: D. Marc Kilgour
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 1998-11-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 1212418
zbMATH Keywords: attribute sampling
zbMATH Keywords: variable sampling
zbMATH Keywords: inspection game
zbMATH Keywords: arms control
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0377-2217(95)00261-8
OpenAlex ID: W2151086975
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1212418