Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
zbMATH Open document ID: 0911.90015
author: Lu Hong
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-05-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1212889
zbMATH Keywords: feasible Bayesian implementation
zbMATH Keywords: exchange economy
zbMATH Keywords: endowment condition
zbMATH Keywords: feasible Nash implementation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1998.2394
OpenAlex ID: W1969976996
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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cites work: Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
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cites work: Implementation in differential information economies
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cites work: Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1998.2394
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1212889