Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0911.90365
author: Michele Piccione
author: Larry Samuelson
author: Ken Binmore
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-05-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1212891
zbMATH Keywords: modified evolutionarily stable strategies
zbMATH Keywords: Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game
zbMATH Keywords: subgame-perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1997.2387
OpenAlex ID: W2055890485
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1997.2387
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1212891