Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
zbMATH Open document ID: 0910.90104
author: Jacques Crémer
author: Fahad Khalil
author: Jean-Charles Rochet
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1998-12-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 1212901
zbMATH Keywords: strategic information gathering
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1998.2415
OpenAlex ID: W3124153996
cites work: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1998.2415
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1212901