Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0911.90359
author: Georg Kirchsteiger
author: Klaus Ritzberger
author: Werner Güth
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1998-10-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 1212937
zbMATH Keywords: commitments
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect observability
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfection
zbMATH Keywords: two-stage game
zbMATH Keywords: noise
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1997.0602
OpenAlex ID: W2118259328
cites work: Commitment and observability in games
cites work: Q3997197
cites work: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
cites work: Sequential Equilibria
cites work: Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
cites work: On stability of perfect equilibrium points
cites work: The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
cites work: A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
cites work: Q3474501
cites work: Games with imperfectly observable commitment
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1997.0602
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1212937