Games with partially enforceable agreements
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Games with partially enforceable agreements
zbMATH Open document ID: 0911.90357
author: James W. Friedman
author: Claudio Mezzetti
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1999-05-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1212942
zbMATH Keywords: imperfectly enforceable agreements
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1997.0618
OpenAlex ID: W2066135424
cites work: Evolutionary Games in Economics
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1997.0618
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1212942