On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0911.90128
author: Maria Angeles de Frutos
author: Robert W. Rosenthal
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1999-05-05T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4418
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 1212943
zbMATH Keywords: sequenced second-price auctions
zbMATH Keywords: identical common-valued objects
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2078290668
cites work: Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
cites work: Bottom-fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions
cites work: The declining price anomaly
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: A Model in which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price
cites work: Simultaneous auctions with synergies and common values
cites work: Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1997.0628
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1212943