Delegation and threat in bargaining
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Delegation and threat in bargaining
zbMATH Open document ID: 0909.90282
author: Björn Segendorff
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1998-10-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1212946
zbMATH Keywords: public good
zbMATH Keywords: low-authority equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: high-authority equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1997.0611
OpenAlex ID: W2082829169
cites work: Strategic delegation in bargaining
cites work: A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
cites work: Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
cites work: Game theory
cites work: A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
cites work: Two-Person Cooperative Games
cites work: Q5697040
cites work: Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1997.0611
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1212946