Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0911.90013
author: Jacob Glazer
author: Ariel Rubinstein
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-05-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 1213814
zbMATH Keywords: noisy signals
zbMATH Keywords: public decision
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2107165558
cites work: Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
cites work: The not-so-secret-agent: professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation.
cites work: Bayesian Implementation
cites work: Q3576736
cites work: Q3026687
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1997.2385
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1213814