Evolution with changing mutation rates
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolution with changing mutation rates
zbMATH Open document ID: 0910.90049
author: Jack Robles
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1998-12-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 1213817
zbMATH Keywords: robustness of long run equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: ergodicity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1997.2382
OpenAlex ID: W2021488458
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1997.2382
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1213817