A learning approach to auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A learning approach to auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0910.90119
author: Shlomit Hon-Snir
author: Dov Monderer
author: Aner Sela
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-04-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: dp97 11.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1218404
zbMATH Keywords: repeated first-price auction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2004521211
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1998.2419
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1218404