Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
zbMATH Open document ID: 0912.90010
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1999-05-25T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/142827
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1234713
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof social choice functions
zbMATH Keywords: generalized median voter schemes
author: Salvador Barberà
author: Jordi Massó
author: Shigehiro Serizawa
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2157039273
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1997.0643
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1234713