Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
zbMATH Open document ID: 0914.90277
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00098-6
author: Bezalel Peleg
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 1999-01-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1238828
zbMATH Keywords: dominant strategies
zbMATH Keywords: coalition-proof equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: strategy proof mechanisms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1238828