Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
zbMATH Open document ID: 0914.90077
author: Son Ku Kim
author: Susheng Wang
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-04-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 1240589
zbMATH Keywords: optimal contracts
zbMATH Keywords: double moral-hazard situation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3082990237
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1998.2439
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1240589