Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
zbMATH Open document ID: 0916.90066
author: José Alcalde
author: David Pérez-Castrillo
author: Antonio Romero-Medina
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-06-30T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/220847
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 1240595
zbMATH Keywords: job matching market
zbMATH Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1981454538
cites work: Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1997.2447
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1240595