Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 0918.90049
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00823-2
author: Shinji Ohseto
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1999-08-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1256840
zbMATH Keywords: mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: cost share rules
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: voluntary participation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1256840