On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 0915.90007
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00005-X
author: Maria Tataru
author: Vincent Merlin
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1999-04-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 1256852
zbMATH Keywords: Borda
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: scoring rules
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: On probability models in voting theory
cites work: Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
cites work: On the volume of hyperbolic polyhedra
cites work: Geometry of voting
cites work: The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
cites work: Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
cites work: The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
full work available at URL: s0165-4896(97)00005-x
OpenAlex ID: W2083278702
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1256852