Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
zbMATH Open document ID: 0916.90056
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00008-5
author: James A. Dearden
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1999-07-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1256856
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1256856