Bargaining in a video experiment. Determinants of boundedly rational behavior
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining in a video experiment. Determinants of boundedly rational behavior
zbMATH Open document ID: 0931.91008
author: Heike Hennig-Schmidt
published in: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
publication date: 1999-03-15T00:00:00Z
review text: Bilateral bargaining situations are of great importance in reality. Bargaining is a frequent type of social interaction in real world settings. There are two methods to get a theoretical answer to the bargaining problem. The first one is the axiomatic approach defining the outcome of bargaining by a list of desirable properties the solution should satisfy. This approach is proposed by Nash in 1950 and is known as Nash bargaining solution. The second method, called the strategic approach, takes into account the bargaining process. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. The generality of the axiomatic approach and the difficulty to assess the reasonable axioms are its major disadvantage. The main disadvantage of the strategic method is that the moves in the bargaining game have to be specified completely and in detail. In this study an experiment is analyzed which is designed to observe experimental subjects in decision situations. In the experiment a two-person characteristic function game was played. Each of the players comprises a group of three (in some cases two) persons. The groups receive a guaranteed payoff if they do not form a coalition but break off the negotiation. The two groups negotiate on the allocation of the coalition value by alternately making offers to the opponent group. The negotiation stops if one of the groups accepts the proposal of the other group or if one of the groups breaks off negotiation. At the end of this discussion they have to take a joint decision. The following decisions can be taken if a group is in decision mode: 1. Making a proposal on the allocation of the coalition value. 2. Shift the initiative to the other group without making a proposal. 3. Accepting the last proposal of the other group. 4. Breaking off negotiation. No rules were given how the decision was to be taken within the groups. The design of the experiment was motivated by the fact that subjects do not behave according to the assumptions of neoclas…
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B02
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-02
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91E10
zbMATH DE Number: 1261675
zbMATH Keywords: bilateral bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: videotaping
zbMATH Keywords: strategic approach
zbMATH Keywords: aspiration levels
zbMATH Keywords: prominence
zbMATH Keywords: equity principle
zbMATH Keywords: fairness
zbMATH Keywords: motivations
zbMATH Keywords: emotions
zbMATH Keywords: social norms
reviewed by: M. P. Moklyachuk
MaRDI profile type: Publication
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1261675